



Bulloch, John, and Harvey Morris. No Friends But the Mountains: The Tragic 
History of the Kurds. London: Viking, 1992. 
van Bruinessen, Martin. Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political 
Structures of Kurdistan. London: Zed Books, 1992. 
Entessar, Nader. Kurdish Ethnonationalism. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992. 
Hassanpour, Amir. Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, 1918-1985. San 
Francisco: Meilen Research University Press, 1992. 
Izady, Mehrdad R. The Kurds: A Concise Handbook. Washington: Crane Russak, 
1992. 
Kreyenbroek, Philip G., and Stefan Sperl, eds. The Kurds: A Contemporary 
Overview. London: Routledge, 1992. 
Laizer, Sheri. Into Kurdistan: Frontiers Under Fire. London: Zed Books, 1991. 
McDowall, David. The Kurds: A Nation Denied. London: Minority Rights Group, 
1992. 
Olson, Robert. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said 
Rebellion, 1880-1925. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1989. 
The sudden emergence of the Kurdish issue in world politics following their 
tragic refugee plight at the hands of Saddam Hussein has spawned a number of 
timely and useful studies. The Bruinessen, Hassanpour, and Izady volumes break 
new ground and will become scholarly classics in the field. The collection of edited 
articles by Kreyenbroek and Sperl offers a number of current analyses of the 
Kurdish situation and thus updates a valuable contribution similarly made more 
than a decade ago by the series of articles edited by Gerard Chailand, People without 
a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, (1980). Bulloch and Morris, Entessar, and 
McDowall offer very readable and current introductions to the overall problem, 
while Laizer presents an interesting, journalistic impression that is part travelogue 
and part political editorial. Olson's study is an objective, historical analysis of the 
Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925 in Turkey that was published just before the 1991 Gulf 
War and is thus sui generis among the other books reviewed here. 
Although still only in his forties, Martin van Bruinessen has clearly estab-
lished himself as the current dean of Kurdish scholars. Based on many years of 
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extensive fieldwork in Kurdistan and comprehensive reading of primary and 
secondary sources, Bruinessen's numerous socioanthropological and political 
studies have greatly increased our knowledge of the Kurds and are the standard by 
which other studies of this largest nation in the world without its own state are 
judged. 
Bruinessen ' s magnum opus is Agha, Shaikh and State, a revised edition of his 
doctoral dissertation of the same title originally published in very limited quantities 
in 1978 and thus until now difficult to find. The present edition admirably maintains 
the earlier edition ' s high standards of academic scholarship with valuable updatings 
to the text and bibliography. Without making any substantial changes to his major 
findings, Bruinessen has also rewritten certain parts and eliminated some of the 
excessive detail of his earlier edition. In the case of the nurcu [followers of Nur, the 
divine Light] movement (pp. 257-59), significant reinterpretations have been made 
based on new findings. The volume is richly documented and has an extensive 
bibliography and useful index. The family trees of some of the major shaikhly 
families of Kurdistan, such as the Barzinjis, and the Barzanis are listed in the 
appendixes. Spellings of Kurdish terms have been standardized and modernized in 
contrast to the earlier edition. Unfortunately, however, the unique photographs of 
the original edition have been omitted from the present one. 
As Bruinessen himself asserts, "this book deals in the first place with the 
primordial loyalties" (p. 7) of tribes and dervish orders. Following an introductory 
chapter that also contains a concise analysis of the Kurdish national movement up 
to 1991, Bruinessen analyzes the structure of the Kurdish tribe and its subdivisions. 
He demonstrates that "the terms of standard anthropological usage, 'tribe', 'clan', 
and 'lineage', appear to be a straightjacket [sic] that ill fits the social reality of 
Kurdistan. Possibly, inspection of the terms used by the Kurds themselves and the 
way they are applied will provide a better insight." (pp. 59-60) In describing specific 
tribes, Bruinessen shows how leadership and conflicts are closely interrelated. He 
also finds that "the manipulation of the central state in order to get the upper hand 
in a local, tribal conflict is a recurrent theme in Kurdish history." (p. 75) 
In the next chapter, Bruinessen presents historical material to illustrate that 
the contemporary Kurdish tribes are not autonomous units, but largely creations of 
surrounding states: 
The impact of the state on the tribes is, in fact, much more varied and 
penetrating than has become clear so far; the . . . destruction of the 
emirates, punitive campaigns against unruly tribes, forced settlement 
and the levying of taxes are only a part of the entire spectrum, (p. 134) 
Chapter 4 deals with the political role of such religious figures as the shaikhs 
and the Qadiri and Naqshbandi orders they lead. "Who does not have a shaikh, his 
shaikh is Satan," is a revealing maxim still repeated in parts of Kurdistan. "Because 
of the respect they enjoy they [the shaikhs] are ideal mediators, in conflicts, which 
in turn gives them political leverage." (p. 210) The demise of the Kurdish emirates 
in the middle of the nineteenth century, "suddenly propelled the shaikhs into the role 
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of political leaders." (p. 229) This and its ability to create new shaikhs more 
efficiently than the older Qadiri order, Bruinessen argues, helps to explain the rapid 
rise of the Naqshbandi order in the nineteenth century. 
Referring to the Shaikh Said rebellion in Turkey in 1925, Bruinessen 
observes that "without the Naqshbandi network he could not have mobilized so 
many warriors; without the belief in his sanctity they would not have fought so 
fanatically." (p. 211) Even more revealingly, Bruinessen concludes that the 
influence provided by the Naqshbandi order 
later assured them key roles in Kurdish nationalism. Shaikh Ubeydullah 
of Nehri, Shaikh Said of Palu and Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the leaders 
of important nationalist movements, were the descendants of shaikhs 
who received the Naqshbandi tariqa [spiritual path] through Mawlana 
Khalid. (p. 224) 
Jalal Talabani, who with Barzani was and still is the other major Iraqi Kurdish leader 
of the twentieth century, also owes his family's original position to its religious role 
as Qadiri shaikhs. 
Although seemingly an arcane discourse on how the Sulemani subdialect of 
the Sorani dialect is becoming the standard Kurdish national language in Iraq, 
Hassanpour's richly detailed analysis proves much more importantly a 
groundbreaking analysis of the Kurdayeti, or Kurdish national movement. 
Hassanpour repeatedly credits Ahmadi Khani (1650-1706) and Haji Qadiri Koyi 
(1817-1897) for their attempts toward achieving this goal through the sword 
\ (political power) and the pen (literary language). In this way only might Kurdish 
independence be achieved and maintained. 
The states which rule the Kurds, however, consider the unrestricted usage of 
the Kurdish language as a threat to their security and territorial integrity. Accord-
ingly, "in spite of its considerable numerical strength (fortieth language of the world 
by number of speakers) and progress in standardization, the Kurdish language . . . 
since the 1920s . . . suffered from various degrees of planned linguicide in Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq and Syria." (p. 466) 
To analyze his subject, Hassanpour adopts a "holistic" (p. xxv) approach that 
considers much more than mere political phenomena. His first four chapters present 
background information and analysis concerning the Kurdish speech area, popula-
tion, and dialects; a review of the literature regarding Kurdish nationalism and 
language standardization; a survey of the social, economic, political, and cultural 
development of Kurdish society; and the literary evolution of the Kurds before the 
twentieth century. 
Hassanpour explains that Kurmanji and Sorani are "the two [main] dialects 
or, rather, dialect groups." (p. 19) Two other, now very minor groups exist, 
however: "one called Hawrami by the Kurds (Avrami or Avamani, in Persian) and 
Gorani/Gurani [or Dimili/Zaza] in Western literature; the other . . . called, here, 
Kirmashani after the name of the major city Kirmashan." (p. 19) 
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According to Hassanpour, "Literary production began in the Hawrami 
dialect and soon after in Kurmanji. Although the Sorani dialect was the last to 
develop literature, its growth has continued uninterruptedly." (p. 69) "Sorani-
speakers in contact with Hawrami (or Gorani) consider this latter dialect the 'purest' 
and 'oldest' variety of Kurdish. They are shocked to find out that [many] European 
scholars class Hawrami and the related Dimili (or Zaza) dialects as non-Kurdish 
tongues." (p. 25) "The idea of a Kurdish nation distinct from, and at war with, the 
ruling Turks, Persians and Arabs was formulated for the first time by Ahmadi Khani 
in his Mem u Zin." (p. 56) Considered the Kurdish national epic, this work is written 
in Kurmanji. 
Hassanpour's fifth chapter analyzes the policies of the states containing 
Kurds toward their language. To do so, he examines the importance of status 
planning or "decisions and actions meant to establish, influence or change the roles 
of a language in society." (p. 102). With the exception of the period from 1918-26 
when the British were trying to encourage Kurdish nationalism against the ambi-
tions of the Turks, Hassanpour demonstrates how the Kurdish language was 
constantly restricted by the Iraqi regimes which were trying to integrate the Kurds 
into the new Iraqi state. "During the period under study, Hnguicidal measures of 
varying degrees undertaken in all the countries concerned [Iran, Iraq, Syria, and 
Turkey] have threatened the very survival of the language." (p. 147) 
Hassanpour's following chapters deal with the standardization of the Sorani 
dialect after World War I when Kurdish was given some limited regional official 
status in Iraq. The situation in the other states is covered much more briefly. First 
Hassanpour analyzes how the usage of Sorani in the mass media, education, 
administration, science, cinema, theater, and phonograph records affected its 
standardization. He follows with a technical discussion of how Sorani has been 
codified in terms of phonology, orthography, morphology, vocabulary, syntax, and 
literary forms, and then surveys its acceptance in Iraq and other states. 
Finally, Hassanpour analyzes urbanization, literacy, the rise of a middle 
class, language planning, and the creation of a Kurdish diaspora. Despite the 
emphasis on the standardization of Sorani, he concludes "that Kurdish is, like 
Armenian, Norwegian, Albanian and a number of other languages, a bi-standard 
language, with one standard for Kurmanji and another for Sorani." (p. 463) 
Hassanpour's lengthy study also contains sixty-five different tables, forty-
two figures, fourteen maps, and a bibliography. Unfortunately there is no index, an 
oversight that is particularly burdensome in a book containing so many different 
names, titles, and concepts. There is also a tendency for redundancy in the text and 
disparaging characterizations of other authors and sources. Edmund Ghareeb, who 
wrote the classic study The Kurdish Question in Iraq, (1981), for example, is 
unfairly said to possess a "pro-Ba'th perspective," (p. 29) while the Institut Kurde 
de Paris is called "uncooperative." (p. 41 ) Nevertheless, these problems prove very 
minor when compared to the magnitude of the impressive and valuable study 
Hassanpour has produced. 
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In many ways Izady's study is the most valuable of all the books reviewed 
here because of its broad scope and non-technical writing style. Indeed, I learned 
more about the Kurds from Izady than I did from all the other books combined. The 
problem with Izady, however, is that in surveying his subject in terms of geography, 
history, human geography, religion, language, literature, society, political and 
contemporary issues, economy, and culture and arts, he sometimes claims too 
much. The blatant assertion "that agriculture was almost surely invented in 
Kurdistan, as was the domestication of almost all basic cereals and livestock, with 
the notable exceptions of cows and rice," (p. 227) is an example. 
First, however, let us sample some of the many invaluable strengths of this 
major study. The very cover of Izady's book enigmatically portrays two Kurds 
gazing up at a skillful carving on the living rock at Taq Bustan. Early in his narrative, 
Izady explains that this monument represents a momentous event in Kurdish 
history, the fall of the last Kurdish kingdom of the classical era, the House of Kayus 
in 380 AD. "This event (despite an as yet unexplained discrepancy of seven years) 
marks the beginning of the Kurdish national calendar, according to which we are 
now (1992) in the year 1604." (p. 40) Izady speculates that "the extra seven years 
may be connected with the veneration with which the number is held in the native 
Kurdish religions." (pp. 241-42) 
Whether Izady is correct or not on the meaning of the seven extra years in the 
calendar he discusses, his analysis of the native Kurdish religions is unique because 
even the best of the other writers, such as Bruinessen, have mentioned only in 
passing "heterodox, syncretistic sects," (p. 23) and invaluable because of the new 
insights it gives to Kurdish culture and character. 
There is an old Kurdish maxim that "compared to the unbeliever, the Kurd 
is a Muslim," while Hanna Batatu has argued in his massive tome, The Old Social 
Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, ( 1978) that possibly the "Kurds 
were more prone than Arabs to Sufism because of its consonance with their pre-
Islamic beliefs." (p. 43) Among the books reviewed here at least, only Izady gives 
us the background information necessary to begin to understand exactly what is 
entailed here. 
In his provocative chapter on religion, he argues that "most non-Muslim 
Kurds follow one of several indigenous Kurdish faiths of great antiquity and 
originality, each of which is a variation on and permutation of an ancient religion 
that can loosely be labeled the 'Cult of Angels,' Yazdani'm Kurdish." (p. 137) Izady 
asserts that even today "about 30-35 percent of all Kurds follow various branches 
of the Cult," (p. 145) and breaks this figure down by identifying Yezidism (5 
percent); Alevism, including AlawismandNusayrism, (20percent); and Yarsanism, 
also known as Aliullahi or Ahl-i Haq, (10-15 percent) as the Cult's three surviving 
branches. (It should be noted that others would dispute Izady's figures as greatly 
inflated.) 
Izady argues that "to identify the Cult or any of its denominations as Islamic 
is a simple mistake, born of a lack of knowledge of the religion, which pre-dates 
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Islam by millennia." (p. 143) He contends that in ancient times the cult combated 
Zoroastrianism, while in the medieval era it opposed the Shiism of Safavid Persia. 
"The Cult still influences all the Kurds at the levels of popular culture and quasi-
religious rituals. The reverence for Khidir or Nabi Khizir 'the living green man of 
the ponds,' is a well-accepted practice [even] among the Muslim Kurds." (p. 138) 
Most scholars describe Alevism as some type of heterdoxical form of Islam. 
Izady, however, argues otherwise, maintaining that "the causes of this common 
mistake are several, but most important is the high station of Ali, the first Muslim 
Shi'ite imam, in both Yarsanism and Alevism.... The Cult's past attempts to absorb 
Shi'ism through pretensions of a shared identity have also confused many a hapless 
historian." (p. 143) Pursuing this reasoning elsewhere, Izady goes so far as to argue 
that the famous Muslim sufi mystic Mevlana, whose followers are known in the 
West as the "Whirling Dervishes," are "almost exclusively Alevi" (p. 161), and 
thus, one must conclude, non-Muslim. (I will leave the accuracy of this assertion 
to those more qualified than I.) 
In supposedly exalting his person to a degree close to divinity during the 
1920s, Shaikh Ahmad Barzani, Mulla Mustafa's older brother, has usually been 
called eccentric or worse. Given the Cult's emphasis on the Lord God or Creator 
emerging through the ages through various avatars, however, Shaikh Ahmad's 
claims to divinity take on new possible meanings. 
The Barzani's exclusive privilege of wearing red turbans may also be 
partially explained by the fact that red "was also the hallmark of the [radical] 
Mazdakite and the Khurramite movements, which are the direct predecessors of 
Alevism" (p. 152). Indeed, in Turkey the Alevis have been called the "Qizilbash" 
or "red heads," a term which now bears a perjorative connotation. 
The Cult's practices of communal ownership and social equality undoubt-
edly have contributed over the years to the charges of sexual promiscuity against the 
Alevis. Some believe that the Cult's male members share their women at certain 
communal religious meetings. "Even today the fiction of this notorious ceremony 
(called mum sondu, 'candle blown out' in Anatolia, or chiragh kushan, 'killing of 
the lights' in Iran) is used by the Cult's Muslim neighbors to demean its followers." 
(p. 141) 
By erroneously identifying the ancient Yezidis with the Umayyad caliph 
Yazid ibn Mu'awiyya, "there is now also a movement to strip the Yezidis of their 
Kurdish identity by.. . declaring them... 'Umayyad Arabs'." (p. 157) This comical 
misnomer is suggestive of such other terms as "mountain Turks" and, according to 
Entessar, "mountain Iranians" (p. 13) so notoriously used in the past in attempts to 
obliterate the Kurds' very identity. In reality, asserts Izady, the term "Yezidis" "is 
derived from the Old and Middle Iranic term yazata oryezad, for 'angel,' rendering 
it to mean 'angelicans" (p. 153), a far cry from the unfair appellation "Devil 
Worshipers" formerly applied to them in the West. 
In his valuable discussion of language, Izady differs from Hassanpour by 
maintaining that Kurdish may be dichotomized into only two major branches: 
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Kurmanji, which includes both what Hassanpour calls Kurmanji (or Bahdinani) and 
Sorani, and Pahlawani — an archaic Kurdish word Izady revives for this purpose 
— which includes Gurani and Dimili (Zaza). He schematically illustrates these 
linguistic relationships and their numerous subdialects with a chart on p. 169 and 
a map on p. 171. 
Izady continues convincingly to differ more substantively with Hassanpour 
when he argues that these differences in the Kurdish language "are far too great by 
any standard linguistic criteria to warrant classification as dialects of the same 
language," (p. 170) and asserts that "Kurmanji and Pahlawani, like French and 
Italian, now qualify as two bono fide languages, and not dialects of the same 
language." (p. 170) He further explains that "there is no standard nomenclature for 
the divisions of Kurdish vernaculars, not just in the works of Western scholars but 
among the Kurds themselves." (p. 170) This lack of standard nomenclature, as well 
as legitimate differences in interpretation and emphasis, partially explain the 
dispute on language between Izady and Hassanpour. 
Regarding numbers, Izady asserts that Kurmanji, which includes what 
Hassanpour calls both Kurmanji and Sorani, is spoken by "about three-quarters of 
all Kurds, and Pahlawani... [by] the rest." (p. 172) He breaks these figures down 
by adding that "there are at present about 15 million speakers of North Kurmanji 
[Hassanpour's Kurmanji]" (p. 172) and concludes, therefore, that it "is spoken by 
a little over half of all Kurds, making it the most common Kurdish vernacular." (p. 
172) "South Kurmanji, adds Izady, "is the language of a plurality of Kurds in Iran 
and Iraq, with about 6 million speakers." (p. 172) As for Pahlawani, Izady asserts 
that "the Dimili branch . . . less accurately but more commonly known as Zaza is 
spoken by about 4.5 million Dimila Kurds," (p. 173) while "today there are roughly 
1.5 million Gurani speakers in Iran and Iraq." (p. 174) 
Indicative of its former status "as the language of high culture and literature 
. . . Gurani now simply means 'lyric poetry' or 'balladry'" (p. 175) in all dialects 
of Kurmanji. Izady collaborates Hassanpour's main thesis concerning the stand-
ardization of Sorani (which Izady also terms "South Kurmanji) when he declares 
that Sorani is "the most dynamic dialect of Kurdish today." (p. 177) This situation 
in part arose because "South Kurmanji [Sorani] has flourished with a disproportion-
ately large volume of printed material produced in . . . [Iraq and Iran] in the last 75 
years, while North Kurmanji [Kurmanji] has been stifled in its main domain in 
Turkey for the same period." (p. 177) 
Another valuable contribution made by Izady is his listing of hundreds of 
"Kurdish Tribes and Tribal Confederacies" on pp. 78-85; inclusion of forty-two 
maps, including the detailed one on p. 75 of "Tribes and Tribal Confederacies" and 
the ones on pp. 123 and 124 of "Cities and Towns in Southern, Central, and Eastern 
Kurdistan" and "Urban Centers of Western and Northern Kurdistan," respectively; 
and eight tables scattered throughout his text. 
The table on p. 119 "Kurdish Present and Near Future Demographic Trends" 
projects that "if present demographic trends hold, as they are likely to, in about two 
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generations' time the Kurds will also replace the Turks as the largest ethnic group 
in Turkey herself," (p. 119) an occurrence that obviously would hold momentous 
but incalculable consequences for the future of that state. 
In an interesting discussion of the Kurdish national character, Izady stresses 
how "the mountains have broken down the language of the Kurds to a babble of 
dialects, their religions to a case study in diversity, and their art and costumes to a 
zoo of colorful variety." (p. 188) He asserts that the "ideal" is the pahlawan, a 
"cavalier and gentleman" who possesses "extreme bravery, wit, and magnanimity," 
(p. 187) and speculates that this is why many Westerners "have found Kurds 
personally appealing." (p. 187) 
Other positive characteristics include precision and attention to detail, being 
joyous, free-spirited, basically unbiased individuals, romantic and often reckless in 
love, warm and generous toward guests in their house, and stress on honor, valor, 
and self-sufficiency. Less admirable characteristics include being an atomist and 
individualist who is thus incapable of group work and group planning. Mulla 
Mustafa Barzani's faults of egotism, opportunism, shortsightedness, and intracta-
bility also constitute "a concise observation of any average Kurd." (p. 186) 
Women have often occupied a surprisingly high status in the supposedly 
tradition-bond Kurdish society. From the earliest times, for example, women took 
part in wars. Their "participation... in the military continues today in Kurdistan, 
as nearly all Kurdish political parties (except for the fundamentalist Islamic parties) 
who command a fighting peshmerga guerrilla group include women in their 
ranks . . . . In politics Kurdish women have been similarly active from the earliest 
times." (p. 194) 
Women also played "a primary role" (p. 195) in the native Kurdish religions 
of the Cult of Angels, which "includes a female among the six Major Avatars of the 
Universal Spirit in every one of the seven epochs of the life of the material world." 
(p. 195). Such female participation helped give rise to the slander of sexual 
promiscuity mentioned previously as sexual equality "in the surrounding commu-
nities and their religions, was not, and still is not, easily tolerated." (p. 195) 
Even in his most valuable and interesting analysis of the ancient religions, 
however, Izady at times exhibits an unfortunate penchant to overstate the influence 
of the Kurds. On the grounds of supposed similarity of tribal names, for example, 
he speculates that the story of King Arthur and the sword Excalibur "may thus be 
akin to . . . the ancient Iranic rite of worshipping the deity represented as a sword 
stuck into the ground." (p. 151) 
More troublesome is Izady's exaggerated claims of a "Pontian Kurdish 
Empire under King Mithridates VI [the Great], ca. 86 BC" (map, p. 37) that totally 
encompasses the Black Sea and included practically all of modern Romania, 
Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, as well as parts of present-day Ukraine and Russia. 
Although Mithridates may have had some Kurdish ancestry in him, to refer to him 
as "the Kurdish Pontian king Mithridates" (p. 38) is bound to strike most historians 
as iconoclastic if not simply silly. 
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Similarly, Armenian historians would question whether "Tigran the Great, 
the greatest king of the Armenians" was "of Kurdish origin... [and] felt his Kurdish 
past more than has been thought," (p. 39) or whether "an important Kurdish tribe 
of the late classical period, the Tirikan . . . may have also given its name to . . . 
Tigran." (p. 31) 
In addition, Izady claims that Safavid Persia's patriarch Shaikh Safi al-Din's 
(d. 1334) ancestry was "clearly . . . Kurdish," (p. 50) that "many Buwayhids such 
as Sharaf al-Dawla Sherzil or Sherzili (r. AD 983-990) clearly have Kurdish 
names," (p. 44) and that "in Lebanon, the Druze political and spiritual leaders of the 
Jumbalat family [and] poet Khalil Gibran . . . are also assimilated Kurds." (p. 110) 
As for modern political leaders, Izady argues that "the list of assimilated 
Kurds includes President Abdul Karim Qasim . . . [and] Saddam Hussein himself 
[who] is partly Kurdish through his father's family (revealingly, his brother's name 
is Barzan)." (p. 110) He adds that Syrian president Hafez Assad is "at least partially 
of Kurdish origin," (p. 110) as well as such Turkish leaders as President Turgut Ozal, 
and former Presidents Kenan Evren and Ismet Inonu. 
Although this Turkish listing is apparently valid, one wonders at some of the 
others. Be that as it may, Izady explains his claims by arguing that "familiarity with 
historical Kurdish migration patterns is perhaps the single most important tool in 
accurately reconstructing Kurdish history." (p. 86) 
On a broader level, it should be noted that Izady's manuscript needed a close, 
final editorial review before it was published to eliminate a number of needless 
repetitions and to correct several minor errors in dates and facts, as well as omissions 
of contemporary political data. Izady fails even to mention, for example, the 
creation in 1988 of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front and its important unifying role in his 
discussion of political disunity among the Iraqi Kurds, (pp. 198-99,212-15) Given 
the existence of a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq since the end of the 1991 
Gulf War, elections for a Kurdish parliament in May 1992, and the creation of a 
government in July of that year, one might also take issue with his assertion that 
"after a year of near independence in the 'liberated' parts of Iraq, the Kurdish 
political parties have again squandered the opportunity to show the outside world 
that an autonomous or an independent Kurdistan is a workable idea." (p. 199) In 
truth, Izady has the facts reversed here; it is the outside world that does not want 
to accept the idea of an independent Kurdish state. Izady (as well as others) would 
do well to heed his own observation that "with the breakup of the Soviet Union and 
the emergence of a dozen new independent states in the area, the Kurds are just 
realizing that international boundaries are not as sacrosanct as they use to be, 
especially in their neighborhood." (p. 200) 
Sorely needed, but lacking too is an index. In addition, Izady's frequent, 
short but often repetitious chapter and intra-chapter bibliographies should have 
been complemented by a more inclusive bibliography at the end. 
Unique among the nine volumes reviewed here is the one by Kreyenbroek 
and Sperl, an edited collection often articles plus an introduction that successfully 
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"brings together many aspects of Kurdish history, politics and culture." (p. 1 ) The 
volume also contains a bibliography and an index which can be most useful for 
bridging together names and concepts in an edited work such as this. 
Martin van Bruinessen and David McDowall, whose books are reviewed in 
this essay, also have articles in this collection: the former surveys broadly, deeply, 
and well "Kurdish society, ethnicity, nationalism and refugee problems," while the 
latter offers "a historical review" of the Kurdish question which could serve as an 
extended abstract of his book. 
Kreyenbroek's article "On the Kurdish language" proves to be a useful 
supplement for Hassanpour's lengthy analysis reviewed above. Kreyenbroek 
briefly surveys the origin and early history of Kurdish, agreeing with Izady that 
"from a linguistic, or at least grammatical point of view . . . Sorani and Kurmanji 
differ as much from each other as English and German, and it would seem more 
appropriate to refer to them as 'languages'." (p. 71) 
The author then goes on to analyze in greater depth "the recent history and 
present position of the Kurdish language in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, with special 
reference to the development of written forms of Kurdish." (p. 68) As does 
Hassanpour, Kreyenbroek finds that "two different standard languages have now 
emerged," (p. 68) of which, Kurmanji, "is one of the very few languages in the world 
whose modern standard form has so evolved almost entirely in exile." (p. 76) This 
is because of the hostile attitude of Turkey, whose Law no. 2932 of 1983 reinforcing 
the banning of the language, Kreyenbroek inadvertently numbers "2392." (p. 75) 
In her brief piece on "Humanitarian legal order and the Kurdish question," 
Jane Connors in effect admits that there is little to be said here when she concludes 
that "it is perhaps safe to conclude that while a significant corpus of international 
humanitarian law exists to regulate intra-state conflict, its application in the Kurdish 
context is problematic." (p. 93) 
In his article "Political aspects of the Kurdish problem in contemporary 
Turkey," Hamit Bozarslan argues that the "rapid and painful rebirth of Kurdish 
nationalism only occurred at the end of the 1950s." (p. 96) This was due to a number 
of causes: the Turkish "experiment in political pluralism,... a . . . combination of 
collective memory and a tradition of rebelliousness,... the new Kurdish intelligent-
sia . . . very strongly influenced by left-wing ideas,.. . [and] the Barzani revolt in 
Iraq." (pp. 96-97) 
Given the subsequent development of a de facto alliance between Turkey and 
the Iraqi Kurds following the 1991 Gulf War, Bozarslan proves prophetic when he 
speculates that "it is not impossible that Ankara will be forced to make contact with 
Kurdish political parties in Iraq in order to neutralize the PKK," (p. 109) and adds 
that "the fact that they [the Kurdish refugees] were accepted [in 1988] marks the 
beginning of the recognition by the Turkish government of a Kurdish entity and of 
a Kurdish problem with which it must deal on a regional level." (p. 109) 
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Munir Morad follows with an excellent analysis of "The situation of Kurds 
in Iraq and Turkey: current trends and prospects." Comparing the two states, he 
maintains that "while the urban middle class and the landed families provided the 
Kurdish movement in Iraq with most of its leaders, the leaders of the Kurdish 
organizations in Turkey have tended to come from impoverished families. An 
inevitable outcome of this situation has been that Turkey's Kurdish politics has been 
noticeably dominated by radical leftist ideologies." (p. 121) 
He further argues that "the diplomatic confusion, breakdown of border 
controls and the emergence of new regional alliances, precipitated by the Iran-Iraq 
conflict, enabled the Kurdish militants for the first time to move relatively freely 
inside Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran." (p. 119) Regarding Turkey, he asserts, "a sub-
economy is taking hold in many Kurdish areas, based on various shady enterprises 
such as smuggling, money laundering and drug processing and trafficking." (p. 120) 
Interestingly, however, Morad believes that "in Turkey, the prospects of an eventual 
easing of the state's firm grip on Kurdish affairs are strengthened by Turkey ' s desire 
to join the European Community," (p. 132) and that "despite the apparent deadlock, 
the prospects of a new realism vis-a-vis the Kurdish population in the region are not 
too distant." (p. 132) 
In "The Kurdish movement in Iraq: 1975-88," A. Sherzad reviews the 
situation before 1975 and then examines the new urban-bred leadership that has 
emerged following the collapse of the traditional social basis in 1975. "Arbil, which 
four years ago had 400,000 inhabitants, now has 900,000." (p. 141) 
Ismet Sheriff Vanly, considered by many to be the "grand old man" of 
Kurdish academics, contributes two pieces, "The Kurds in Syria and Lebanon" and 
"The Kurds in the Soviet Union." In the first article he asserts that in Syria "in 1988 
. . . it seems probable that the Kurds... numbered at least a million or 9-10 per cent" 
(p. 146) of the population, and "in Lebanon in 1983 . . . about 90,000." (p. 165) 
Offering a personal note, Vanly owns that he was condemned to death in 
absentia by Syria in 1965 for "activities in international circles against Arab 
interests." (p. 157) The authorities did not try to implement the sentence, however, 
"which was rather civilized of them by comparison with the Iraqi secret service's 
attempt at a summary execution... in Lausanne in October 1976, which I survived 
with two bullets in the head." (p. 157) 
The author argues that although Assad's "regime has conceded absolutely 
nothing to the Kurds as a cultural and national minority," (p. 159) it has used them 
to help buoy up its minority Alawite rule and has given the Turkish PKK "what may 
justifiably be called a strategic alliance." (p. 169) 
On the matter of Arabized Kurds in Lebanon, Vanly mentions "the Jumblat, 
the leading family of the Lebanese Druze community in the Shouf, whose name is 
the arabized form of the Kurdish 'Jan-Polaa" meaning 'Steel body'." (p. 164) He 
also argues that "the antiquity of the Kurdish presence in Syria" (p. 145) is beyond 
question. Kurd-Dagh [Mountain of the Kurds] and the huge fortress known as 
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"Kirak des Chevaliers" or in Arabic "Hisn al-Akrad" [Castle of the Kurds] speak to 
this fact. Apparently "Kirak" is simply a corruption of the word "Akrad," the Arabic 
plural for Kurd. 
On the other hand, the much smaller Kurdish community in Lebanon "is 
essentially composed of immigrants... who left the areas of Mardin and Bohtan in 
Turkish Kurdistan after the failure of the Kurdish uprisings in the early part of the 
century and settled in Beirut in the 1920s and 1930s." (pp. 164-65) "In Lebanon 
there is no nationalist anti-Kurdish feeling as there is in Syria, Turkey, and Iraq." 
(p. 165) 
In "The Development of Nationalism in Iranian Kurdistan," Fereshteh 
Koohi-Kamali examines the historical, social, and economic background of the 
Iranian Kurds to help explain their persistent demands for ethnic and political 
recognition. In her useful and informative article, she argues that "the Islamic 
revolution provided a golden opportunity for Kurdish nationalism, which by 1979 
had become far more politically organized than it had been in 1946." (p. 180) 
The Islamic republic's "continued attachment. . . to the boundaries of the 
nation-state called 'Iran,'" (p. 190) even more than "the idea of the universality and 
expansion of Islam as outlined by Khomeini and his followers [however]... led to 
the assassination of Ghassemlou." (p. 190) Indeed, Koohi-Kamali maintains that 
"one of the three government delegates. . . [involved in the murder] was a high-
ranking revolutionary guard said to be very close to the then Speaker of Parliament, 
Rafsanjani." (p. 191 ) Thus, she concludes that "as long as the Islamic regime retains 
its present political attitudes and structure, the possibility of any accommodation for 
the Kurds and their national demands is remote." (p. 190) 
In the final article "The Kurds in the Soviet Union," Vanly examines the 
little-known history of "Red" Kurdistan as an autonomous region with Lachin as its 
capital and Gussi Gajev as its first leader from 1923 until "in 1929 the Baku 
government reduced Kurdistan from an uyezd to an okrug, the lowest territorial unit 
for the Soviet non-Russian nationalities." (p. 203) Regarding the current popula-
tion, Vanly writes that "the total number of Kurds living within the USSR today is 
unknown. Soviet Kurds themselves give estimates that range from approximately 
300,000 to a precise figure of 1,120,000." (p. 207) 
Although "the Armenian response to the massacres of 1895-6 was to 
massacre the Kurds in Armenia and north Kurdistan during the Russian incursions 
of 1914-15," (p. 197) Vanly also admits that "Armenia, it must be conceded, is the 
only Soviet republic which preserved and protected Kurdish cultural infrastructures 
after the persecutions under Stalin." (p. 208) 
Entessar, McDowall, and Bulloch and Morris present similar, useful intro-
ductions to the Kurdish question that offer little, however, that is new. Entessar 
proceeds from a scholarly point of view with ample documentation plus a bibliog-
raphy and index. Bulloch and Morris offer a fast-paced, journalistic narrative which 
is lacking in any documentation, bibliography, or index. Thus it will have only 
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limited utility for scholars. McDowall, on the other hand, has updated and 
lengthened his earlier editions of a booklet published by the Minority Rights Group 
in London, The Kurds. Although his approach is basically journalistic, he does use 
footnotes and has a modest "select bibliography" and index. There are also 
photographs and several maps in his work. 
Entessar introduces his subject by presenting an overview of Kurdish 
ethnicity in which his usage of such concepts as "internal colonialism and unequal 
center-periphery relations" (p. 8) adds analytical clarity to the subject. This is 
followed by individual chapters surveying the Kurdish situation in Iran, Iraq, and 
Turkey. The concluding two chapters are perhaps the most valuable because they 
analyze recent events concerning the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s; the 1991 Gulf 
War and its aftermath, and the relevance of international legal, humanitarian, and 
constitutional principles to the Kurds. 
In looking to the future, Entessar maintains that "there has developed a large 
body of international doctrines and principles with near universal acceptability that 
are applicable to the Kurdish dilemma in the Middle East." (p. 164) He specifically 
mentions Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
which declares that 
in those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language. 
Entessar closes his analysis by recommending pluralism, federalism, and propor-
tional representation as constitutional techniques that would help to foster a fair 
solution to the Kurdish problem. 
In his pithy study, McDowall illustrates how the Kurds "are torn apart by 
internal quarrels and disputes" (p. 3) as much as from the repressive governments 
under whom they have lived. Concise, informative chapters follow, presenting a 
very readable introduction to the Kurdish problem. McDowall terms the Alevi 
Kurds in Turkey "a minority within a minority" (p. 57) since only one-third of the 
Alevis in Turkey are Kurdish. He concludes that although in Turkey "officially, the 
government is secular ... Sunni Islam remains perceived as the established religion, 
and there is a culture of hostility to Shi'ism and more particularly to Alevis." (p. 60) 
In closing, McDowall recommends that "the United Nations must involve 
itself in the fate of the Kurdish people." (p. 132) However, "the United Nations 
should make it clear to the Kurdish leaderships in the respective countries that any 
deal struck which affords the Kurds a reasonable say in the running of their own 
affairs and in cultural self-expression must include Kurdish recognition of state 
legitimacy." (pp. 132-33) 
In their first two chapters, Bulloch and Morris plunge into a description of the 
failed Iraqi Kurdish uprising that followed Saddam's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War. 
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"The Kurds believed what they heard; they were lured into a sense of false 
confidence by the apparently positive signals from Western capitals, and embarked 
on a rebellion which they assumed would have the backing of the West." (p. 3) The 
authors point out that "as late as the end of March a clandestine radio station called 
the Voice of Free Iraq was still calling on the Kurds to rise up and . . . depose 'the 
evil Saddam.' That station was subsidized by the CIA." (pp. 30-31) Thus the two 
explain: "What the president really meant, it emerged, was that the United States 
would like to see a compliant military regime in power in Baghdad. Kurds and Shia 
need not apply." (p. 12) 
Discussing the overthrow of Qassem in 1963, Bulloch and Morris write that 
"the Baath gunmen often seemed to know who they were looking for as they 
searched out communist activists; according to a number of sources, this was 
because they had been in contact with American intelligence, which was eager to 
break the back of the strongest communist party in the Middle East at that time." (p. 
124) This US role continued when "in 1973 Massoud and Idriss Barzani went on 
a secret mission to Washington, where they met Richard Helms, then head of the 
CIA, and Al Haig, the White House chief of staff. As a result of these meetings, 
Israeli advisers began operating in Kurdistan." (p. 135) (Actually the Israelis had 
been covertly helping the Iraqi Kurds since at least the 1960s.) 
Concerning contemporary terrorism, the two authors maintain that "in 1991 
Turkish secret police and intelligence agents began adopting the same methods.... 
A number of Kurdish activists and [others] . . . were killed with a single bullet 
through the back of the head, sure sign of an 'execution' by government death 
squads." (p. 186) 
Not necessarily so. Although some have speculated that the Turkish 
government has somehow been involved in these killings through its more than 
2,500 Special Team members (anti-guerrillas) being used against the PKK or gladio 
forces originally created in the 1950s to continue the struggle against some enemy 
who had conquered Turkey, the identity of the so-called "Hizballah-contras" 
remains uncertain. The Turkish government has denied involvement, and recently 
evidence has emerged that various anti-PKK groups are perpetrating at least some 
of the murders because they believe that the government is unable to control the 
PKK. 
Similar is the accusation that Turkish President Turgut Ozal "spoke on 
several occasions as if he were ready to revive the Mosul question." (p. 189) 
Although Turkey has certainly taken a keen interest in the unstable situation in 
northern Iraq, even massively intervening there in what was in effect a joint 
operation with the Iraqi Kurds against the PKK in October 1992, the rationale 
clearly was to eliminate the PKK bases there and forestall another large influx of 
Iraqi Kurdish refugees fleeing to Turkey from the wrath of Saddam as has already 
occurred twice in the past five years. 
In discussing Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, the two authors 
claim that he is "still occasionally leading fighting patrols into Turkey. He was 
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prominent in the underground Turkish Communist Party before joining the PKK." 
(p. 168) None of this is true. Ocalan himself has stated that he has not been in Turkey 
since he fled it shortly before the 1980 coup. Indeed common sense would dictate 
that he would not risk his life on such missions. Furthermore, although a Marxist, 
Ocalan never belonged to any Turkish Communist Party. As for "joining the PKK," 
he in truth created it with a few followers in November 1978 out of another group 
he had been leading since 1974. 
Sheri Laizer, an English writer and film researcher, has written a journalistic 
study that is part travelogue, part political editorial and polemic, and almost entirely 
a Kurdish apology. In so doing, she does give her readers an interesting picture of 
traditional and modern Kurdish society in Turkey and Iraq against the backdrop of 
officially sanctioned state repression. Based on her travels and conversations in 
situ, Laizer, for example, notes the importance of such attributes as songs, folklore, 
the mountains, geographical isolation, and the lack of outside information about the 
Kurds. 
Her work is so sympathetic to the Kurds and hostile to the Turks, however, 
that one begins to question her objectivity. She seriously argues, for example, that 
the "Iraqi Kurds do not torture prisoners, even to extract vital information," (p. 3) 
while critically noting that "the outlawed Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) of Turkey 
. . . has been misrepresented in international political intrigues." (p. 64) The Iraqi 
Kurds who fled Saddam's chemical attacks in 1988, she adds, have become "a 
virtual prisoner of the Turks." (p. 106) 
While briefly mentioning the supposed British influence on the Kurdish 
revolt of 1925 in Turkey led by Shaikh Said, Laizer declares that Stephen 
Pelletiere' s, The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf, ( 1984) is an "authorative 
[sic] work on the Kurds" (p. 84), which it is not, while she obviously is unaware of 
one of the works that is, Robert Olson's work reviewed below. In her ensuing 
commentary, moreover, incredibly she tells her gullible readers that "the British 
mandate [in Iraq] ended in 1958" (p. 84), and that "more than 25,000 [Kurdish] 
villages" (p. 92) have been destroyed in Iraq by the government. The actual date, 
of course, is 1932, while, without minimizing the extent of Saddam's anti-Kurdish 
measures, Laizer's second figure is five time lager than that claimed even by the 
Kurds themselves. 
Despite her political misperceptions, Laizer's feminist instincts prove more 
accurate when she critically comments about the lack of concern Kurdish men 
demonstrate toward birth control : "Talk about pride, vanity, and stubbornness ! The 
male of the species is all of these fourfold." (p. 13) Later, in discussing the stifling 
traditional roles played by Kurdish women, she adds that "it was the lives of Kurdish 
women that were most in need of urgent reform." (p. 107) 
In discussing the Turkish suppression of Kurdish culture, Laizer also 
accurately notes that although "there are highly successful Kurds in all walks of life 
. . . there is a price to pay It is usually the loss of Kurdish identity." (p. 72) She 
further comments that "for many, it is no sacrifice to deny their Kurdishness, for 
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Kurdishness has been equated with social inferiority by the Turks." (p. 65) 
Laizer's rather short study concludes with four appendices: the Treaty of 
Sevres (1920), Articles 62-4 concerning a proposed Kurdish state; "An Interview 
with Massoud Barzani" in August 1989; "The Peoples' National Liberation Army 
(ARGK) and the United Kurdish Front (Political Update, March 1991)," which 
contains statements made by Abdullah Ocalan of the PKK; and a listing of eight 
"Kurdish Cultural Centres, Institutes, Archives and Contact Offices." There is also 
a select bibliography and short index. 
Robert Olson's analysis of the Sheikh Said Rebellion in Turkey in 1925 is a 
dispassionate, objective analysis based largely on primary documents from the 
British Air Ministry files and Colonial Office records. As such, it covers very 
different ground compared to the eight books reviewed above. 
Although the Sheikh Said rebellion was short-lived and rather easily de-
feated, Olson correctly maintains that it "was the first large-scale nationalist 
rebellion by the Kurds," (p. 153) and, given the current Kurdish insurgency in 
Turkey, "a harbinger of the future." (p. 122) What is more, the rebellion's mixture 
of religious with nationalist themes foreshadowed the Iranian Revolution more than 
a half century later. 
As the author notes, "of the major nineteen military engagements in which 
the Turkish armed forces participated from 1924 and 1938, all but two were against 
or connected with efforts to suppress Kurdish rebellions and nationalism," (p. 127) 
a pattern that has continued to the present day. He states that 
the struggle against Kurdish nationalism, in which certain patterns of 
policies were implemented and against which certain nationalist, 
ideological, and psychological premises and attitudes were initially 
adopted in 1925, continued to play an important role in Turkey's 
policy decisions more than fifty years after the Sheikh Said rebellion. 
(P- 161) 
Among these patterns, Olson notes "the consequence of Turkey's eschewing 
interference in the internal affairs of other countries and... the Turkish motto: peace 
at home and peace abroad," (p. 151) as well as revolutionary laws dealing with the 
civil code, dress and headgear, and the alphabet. 
Other factors also have remained constant. The Kurds, for example, remain 
as divided today as they were when "none of the Kurdish notables of the town 
[Diyarbakir] supported the [Sheikh Said] rebellion." (p. 98) Then and now "harsh 
measures were partially responsible for the continuing Kurdish resistance and 
rebellion." (p. 120) Following the rebellion, "the independence tribunals arrested 
a total of 7,440 people and executed 660. . . [and] deportations of Kurds continued 
throughout 1926." (p. 125) 
As for the British, "although... various schemes had been floated to stir up 
the Kurds throughout 1920-1921, they had begun to be viewed with increasing 
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skepticism by the middle of 1921." (p. 81) Winston Churchill, for example, 
declared: 
'We have not been able to liquidate all the promises given or alleged 
to have been given to the Arabs during the war. I am entirely opposed 
to creating similar difficulties with the Kurds.' By 1 December 1921, 
there was then, unanimous disapproval of proposals... to instigate 
Kurdish rebellion against the Turks, (p. 76) 
In his conclusion, Olson argues that "the Turks... proclaimed a nationalism 
that was inclusive of the Kurds, however prejudicial, while Kurdish nationalism, 
imperatively so, was exclusive of the Turks and their nationalism." (p. 156) Thus, 
while "the Kurds and Kurdish nationalism may not be the single most important 
factor . . . their influence on the development of modern Turkey has been most 
underestimated by scholars and students of Turkey." (p. 160) 
By way of criticism, it might be mentioned that at times Olson is repetitious. 
He tells his reader, for example, on a number of occasions that "the Sheikh Said 
rebellion broke out prematurely on 8 February 1925," (p. 107) and does the same 
with several other facts. He devotes a page and a half to such unnecessary details 
as listing "as of 1 April 1925, the distribution, location, and officers of the Turkish 
forces deployed and mobilized," (p. 105) particulars best left in the dusty archives 
where Olson first discovered them or placed in one of the many appendices he adds 
to his text. 
The famous Turkish scholar, Ismail Besikci, who has spent most of the past 
decade in a Turkish prison for his writings about the Kurds in Turkey, is not of 
Kurdish origin alleged or otherwise as Olson would have it. (p. 37) Furthermore, 
Olson allows at least several typos concerning dates to creep into his manuscript. 
Thus the reader is incorrectly told "of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1888, (p. 5) 
"the resignation of Ismet Inonu on 22 November 1922" (p. 86) (when a paragraph 
earlier the text stated that the year was 1924), and Mustafa Kemal's telegraph to 
Inonu on 19 February 1921, (p. 88) when it is clear from the text that 1925 is meant. 
On the macro level, one might question why Olson only consulted the British 
archives when relevant archival sources also exist both in other European states and, 
of course, Turkey itself. As a result, the reader often sees only what the British 
considered significant, while the position of the Kurds and Turks—the supposed 
subjects of the study—recedes. 
These problems notwithstanding, Olson has brought first-rate scholarship to 
his subject. His analysis will be the definitive one in English of the Sheikh Said 
rebellion and thus an important backdrop to more contemporary events. Olson 
concludes his work with eight appendices, copious notes, a bibliography, and an 
index. 
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